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Abstract
We point out an error in the protocol for mixed adversaries and
zero error from the Crypto 98 paper by Fitzi, Hirt and Maurer. We
show that the protocol only works under a stronger requirement on the
adversary than the one claimed. Hence the bound on the adversary’s
corruption capability given there is not tight. Subsequent work has
shown, however, a new bound which is indeed tight.
1 Introduction
In [1], Fitzi, Hirt and Maurer present a treatment of mixed adversaries against
multiparty computation protocols (in the model with private channels and
unconditional security). Such an adversary can actively corrupt ta of the n
players, meaning that he takes full control over them, and can additionally
passively corrupt tp players, meaning that he gets access to all their data,
but they continue to follow the protocol. They also consider adversaries that
can further fail corrupt some players, simply making them stop playing, but
we do not need to consider this for the purpose of this note.
The goal of [1] is to give bounds on tp, ta necessary and sufficient to
enable general multiparty computation. In particular, for the case of perfect
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protocols (i.e. with zero error probability), it is claimed that the condition
3ta + tp < n and 2ta + 2tp < n is necessary and sufficient.
In this short note, we point out that this result is not correct. The
condition is not sufficient: the protocol given in [1] to show it suffices in fact
only works when the stronger 3ta + 2tp < n is satisfied.
This is no coincidence: having been informed about the error, Fitzi, Hirt
and Maurer have managed to show that in fact 3ta + 2tp < n is necessary; or
more precisely: there are functions that cannot be computed securely against
an adversary violating the condition.
Note that nothing in this note concerns the results in [1] about protocols
with non-zero error. To the best of our knowledge, those results are correct.
2 The Protocol and the Problem
The protocol given in [1] is a natural generalization of the BGW protocol [2]:
since the number of players from which the adversary can get information is
ta + tp, we will share information using polynomials of degree d = ta + tp.
The verifiable secret sharing protocol of BGW can then be excuted as is,
except that the rule for disqualifying a dealer in this case will be that he is
out if more than ta players accuse him. It is argued (correctly) in [1] that
this works if (and only if) 3ta + tp < n.
The problem arises in the protocol for multiplying two shared values.
This is based on the usual idea of having the players locally multiply values
of the two polynomials used to share the values. Clearly, we need to have
that 2d = 2ta + 2tp < n for this to work at all: otherwise there would not be
enough players to determine the resulting polynomial (of degree 2d).
In order to ensure that the multiplication works correctly when ta > 0,
players need to prove that they perform their local multiplications correctly.
And it is in the subprotocol for this purpose that the problem occurs. Assume
that a player D has shared values a, b using polynomials f(x), g(x), so that
a = f(0), b = g(0) and player i holds f(i), g(i). We need to generate a new
polynomial (of degree d) that is guaranteed to have value c = ab in 0.
If we define h(x) = f(x)g(x), then h(0) = ab, and each player can com-
pute h(i) = f(i)g(i). Of course, h has degree 2d. However, player D knows
all of h(x), and it is shown in [2] how to exploit this: D will choose a random
polynomial h1(x) of degree d, and with the same leading coefficient as h(x).
He will distribute it using the VSS protocol, such that all players can verify
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that it has degree d. Then player i can compute h(i) − idh1(i) which is the
value of h(x)− xdh1(x) in point i. This polynomial has degree 2d − 1. The
same method can be applied again, and so after subtracting shifted versions
of h1(x), ..., hd(x), we end up with a polynomial that is guaranteed to have
the same value in 0 as h, and can be verified to have degree d.
Consider what happens to this protocol when applied in a situation where
we assume only that 3ta+ tp < n and 2ta + 2tp < n. Note that in some cases,
we can still have 3ta + 2tp ≥ n, and we will argue that in these cases, the
above subprotocol fails. For concreteness, let us think of the case where
2tp + 2ta = n− 1, and ta > 0.
The adversary can make the protocol fail whenever D is actively cor-
rupted, as follows: when players have multiplied their values of f(x) and
g(x), the actively corrupted players will simply change their minds about
their value of g(i)h(i) and replace it by another value (which in this case can
be chosen arbitrarily). Since here 2d = n − 1, any set of n values is consis-
tent with some polynomial of degree 2d. Let h′(x) be the new polynomial.
Clearly, the adversary can choose h′ such that h′(0) is any value he desires.
Now all that remains is for D to choose his polynomials h1(x), ..., hd(x) such
that they will correctly reduce the degree of the new polynomial h′(x) to
degree d. An honest player will not be able to tell the difference between this
and an honest D.
Clearly this attack works whenever the set of players following the proto-
col is too small to determine uniquely a polynomial of degree 2d, i.e. when
n − ta ≤ 2d = 2ta + 2tp. In other words, the attack fails precisely when
3ta + 2tp < n. It is not hard to show that in this case not only does the
attack fail, the multiplication protocol in is fact secure.
Since this subprotocol is the only one that does not work also under
the weaker condition, we see that the condition 3ta + 2tp < n is sufficient
for general multiparty computation. In the Crypto version of [1], it is only
proved that 3ta + tp < n and 2ta + 2tp < n is necessary. Fortunately, this is
not an optimal result: having been informed about the mistake, the authors
of [1] have managed to show that in fact 3ta + 2tp < n is also necessary.
For completeness, we include here a sketch of their proof . More details will
appear in an upcoming final version of [1].
In order to prove the necessity of 3ta + 2tp < n, assume for contradiction
that for some ta, tp with 3ta+tp ≥ n every function can be computed perfectly
(ta, tp)-securely. Then one can construct a protocol for three processors p̂1,
p̂2, and p̂3, where p̂1 plays for ta + tp processors, p̂2 plays for ta + tp other
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processors, and p̂3 plays for the remaining at most tp processors. This new
protocol is secure with respect to an adversary that passively corrupts either
p̂1 or p̂2, or actively corrupts p̂3.
It follows that there exists a protocol secure against such an adversary for
computing the logical AND of two bits x1 and x2 held by p̂1 and p̂2, respectively.
Let T denote the transcript of the broadcast channel of a run of that protocol
(if no broadcast channel is available, let T = ∅), and let Tij (1 ≤ i < j ≤
3) denote the transcript of the channels between p̂i and p̂j . Due to the
requirement of perfect privacy, p̂1 will not send any information about his
bit x1 over T12 or over T before he knows x2 (if P1 knows that x2 = 1 he
can reveal x1). Similarly, p̂2 will not send any information about x2 over
T12 or over T before he knows x1. Hence the only escape from this deadlock
would be to use p̂3. However, as T12 and T jointly give no information about
x2, a random misbehavior of an actively corrupted p̂3 (ignore all received
messages and send random bits whenever a message must be sent) would
with some (possibly negligible) probability make p̂1 receive the wrong output,
contradicting the perfect security of the protocol.
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